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Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of secure
cooperative updates for XML documents in distributed
systems. In particular, we introduce the basic notions
underlying a ﬂow language by using which a user
can specify the ﬂow that a given XML document has
to follow within a group of cooperating subjects. A
key feature of the ﬂow language is to be based on
the notion of subject credentials. In addition, we
describe a policy language to specify special-purpose
authorizations allowing selected subjects to modify or
extend a given document ﬂow. Finally, we brieﬂy
describe the protocols for verifying that the path
followed by a document in a collaborative group agrees
with the speciﬁed ﬂow and to verify that modiﬁcations
on a given ﬂow are in accordance with the speciﬁed
authorizations.
1 Introduction
The exchange of documents on the Web, in partic-
ular XML documents [5], in the framework of collab-
orative and distributed applications [6] involving dif-
ferent parties, such as subjects belonging to diﬀerent
organizations, requires a proper infrastructure. In par-
ticular, conﬁdentiality and integrity must be preserved
for documents ﬂowing among diﬀerent parties making
also sure that only authorized subjects be able to mod-
ify the documents. An approach to achieve such goals
is based on encrypting the document contents and on
generating some special-purpose control information,
that are used by a subject to locally check the in-
tegrity of the document portions for which it possesses
at least an authorization [1]. The encrypted document
and the corresponding control information form the so
called package. Another key requirement, that, up to
now, has not been widely investigated, when dealing
with distributed and collaborative applications, is the
support for the speciﬁcation of document ﬂow policies,
that is, policies regulating the set of subjects (hereafter
called collaborative group), that must receive a pack-
age during the update process. We believe that this is
an important requirement since document updates in
many organizations must be governed by speciﬁc poli-
cies that reﬂect the internal rules of the organizations.
Many issues need to be addressed for achieving this
goal. First, a ﬂow policy speciﬁcation requires the de-
velopment of a high level speciﬁcation language. The
main features of this language must be the possibil-
ity of generating totally or partially speciﬁed lists of
subjects that will have to receive a document in a dis-
tributed and cooperative update process and the pos-
sibility of specifying which subjects can extend a ﬂow
policy by adding new receivers. We also believe that
the language must support ﬂexible ways of qualifying
subjects, based on the notion of credentials. Secondly,
the updates to the original document and to the orig-
inal ﬂow policy must be regulated by proper access
control policies and modiﬁcation control rules, respec-
tively. These policies and rules must be speciﬁed by
the subjects, called here and in what follows origi-
nators, that have generated the documents and ﬂow
policies. Thus, the originators have to specify who
can modify which portions of a particular document
or ﬂow policy and which privileges can be exercised
over them. Finally, a proper infrastructure is required
for the decentralized enforcement of the stated policies
and rules.
In this paper, we propose an approach to these is-
sues. Our approach is based on the generation of some
control information, that are attached to the docu-
ment and updated as the document ﬂows, and that
make a subject able to locally check the correctness
of the path followed by the document till that point
and of the modiﬁcations performed over it. We ﬁrst
present the language we have developed for specify-
ing ﬂow policies and modiﬁcation control rules. Then,
we present the architecture and related protocols that
we have developed for supporting distributed and col-
laborative update processes for XML documents (see
Figure 1). The architecture includes a Parser, that an-
alyzes the document and the corresponding ﬂow policy.
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Figure 1: Distributed update of documents: overall schema
grouping together the portions to which the same set
of access control policies apply. Then, it applies the
modiﬁcation control rules to the ﬂow policy portions
grouping them according to the set of rules that ap-
ply to those portions. As a result of this ﬁrst step
we have the package structure containing the docu-
ment and the ﬂow policy portions grouped according
to the above-mentioned strategy. Then, the Encryp-
tion module, another relevant component of our archi-
tecture, encrypts the document portions using a dif-
ferent key for each generated group, for conﬁdentiality
purposes. Then, the Control Information Generator
generates some control information for both the doc-
ument and the ﬂow policy. Finally the encrypted doc-
ument, the ﬂow policy and all the control information
are inserted in the package by the Dispatcher module.
This module is also in charge of sending the package
to the ﬁrst chosen subject in the collaborative group.
The Recovery module receives recovery requests from
the subjects and sends back the last correct version of
the received corrupted package.
Since in a previous paper [2] we have already pre-
sented an approach to distributed and collaborative
updates of XML documents, in this paper we focus on
ﬂow policy management.
The approach we present is based on the follow-
ing assumptions: 1) all the originators are considered
trusted; 2) a package can be sent to only one sub-
sequent receiver; 3) no loss of messages, that is each
message sent to a subject is certainly received.
To the best of our knowledge, the work reported
in this paper is the ﬁrst addressing the problem of ﬂow
policy management in distributed systems. This work
is part of the Author-X project [3], whose aim is to
provide a comprehensive system for the protection of
XML documents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the ﬂow policy modiﬁca-
tion model on which our approach relies, introduc-
ing also the ﬂow policy speciﬁcation language. Sec-
tion 3 presents the control information required by
our approach for the integrity check of the ﬂow pol-
icy content, whereas Section 4 introduces the informa-
tion inserted in the package by the subjects that have
modiﬁed the document/ﬂow policy content. Finally,
Section 5 presents the protocols at the originator and
receiver sides, whereas Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Flow Policy Modiﬁcation Control
Model
A modiﬁcation control model is necessary to spec-
ify who can modify which portions of a ﬂow policy and
how it can do that. Before presenting our ﬂow policy
modiﬁcation control model we need to better intro-
duce the concept of ﬂow policy. A ﬂow policy contains
the sequence of subjects that must receive the pack-age with which it is associated. This sequence can be
fully speciﬁed in advance, at the beginning of the up-
date process, or partially speciﬁed when the process
starts and then modiﬁed and extended by authorized
subjects. A ﬂow policy attachment does not neces-
sarily contain the univocally speciﬁed list of receivers,
but it can contain some receiver speciﬁcations,t h a ti s ,
sets of properties that have to be veriﬁed by the re-
ceivers. Each receiver speciﬁcation can also contain
some alternative receiver proﬁles, speciﬁed by using
an XML-based language called X-Sec [4]. A receiver
is considered legal for a particular receiver speciﬁca-
tion if it satisﬁes at least one of the receiver proﬁles
that belong to that speciﬁcation. Our ﬂow policy spec-
iﬁcation language enables also an originator to grant
a receiver the permission of extending a ﬂow policy
by inserting a sub-ﬂow policy. This is supported by
associating the value subpath, that enables an inser-
tion, or nosubpath, that denies an insertion, with a
receiver proﬁle. This value is denoted as an extension
speciﬁcation.
Example 1 An example of ﬂow policy is the follow-
ing:
<{rs1,(rp1,"//vice manager[@Department="R&D"]",
subpath), (rp2, "//secretary[@Department="R&D"]",
nosubpath)}, {rs2,(rp3,"//accountant[@level="third"]",
subpath)}, {rs3,(rp4,"//company director", subpath)}>
which speciﬁes that the ﬁrst receiver must be a vice
manager or a secretary of the ”R&D” Department;
the second receiver must be a third level accountant;
whereas the third receiver must be a company director.
Moreover, the ﬂow policy speciﬁes that whereas vice
managers, accountants and company directors are
entitled to insert a new sub-policy into this ﬂow policy,
secretaries are not enabled to do so.
{rs1,(rp1,"//vice manager[@Department="R&D"]",subpath),
(rp2,"//secretary[@Department="R&D"]", nosubpath)} is
an example of receiver speciﬁcation consisting of two
receiver proﬁles:
(rp1,"//vice manager[@Department="R&D"]",subpath) and
(rp2, "//secretary[@Department="R&D"]", nosubpath). 
Our modiﬁcation control model consists of a set of
modiﬁcation control rules speciﬁed in terms of subjects
that can modify a ﬂow policy, a privilege that can be
exercised by authorized subjects, an object on which
the privilege can be exercised, and some propagation
options, to reduce the number of rules to be speciﬁed.
Subjects. In our model subjects are qualiﬁed by
means of conditions speciﬁed against credentials.F i g -
ure 2 shows an example of XML credentials speciﬁed
according to X-Sec [4]. Each subject has one or more
credentials, issued by diﬀerent Certiﬁcation Author-
ities (CAs). Conditions speciﬁed on credentials are
denoted as credential expressions, and are speciﬁed by
means of an XPath-based language [7].
<vice manager cid=“50”>
<name>
<Fname> Jim </Fname>
<lname > Mason </lname>
</name>
<age> 52 </age>
<department> R&D </department>
<salary> 9,000 </salary>
<category > Top Executive </category>
</vice manager>
<secretary cid=“12”, vice manager=“50”>
<name>
<Fname> Alice </Fname>
<lname > Brown </lname>
</name>
<age> 38 </age>
<department> R&D </department>
<salary> 2,000 </salary>
<level > third </level>
<duty > vice manager secretary </duty>
</secretary>
Figure 2: Examples of XML credentials
Privileges. The privileges supported by our model
are delete and update. The ﬁrst privilege can be ex-
ercised over one or more receiver speciﬁcations or over
one or more receiver proﬁles; whereas the second can
be exercised only over the credential expressions that
describe the receiver proﬁles or the extension speciﬁ-
cations.
Objects. Objects to which a modiﬁcation control
rule applies can be receiver speciﬁcations, receiver pro-
ﬁles, credential expressions, and extension speciﬁca-
tions, according to the privilege speciﬁed in the rule,
as discussed above.
Propagation options. Finally, our model supports
the deﬁnition of two propagation options: PROP and
NO PROP. The propagation option PROP causes the ap-
plication of a rule to the speciﬁed object and to all
the objects that compose it, whereas NO PROP causes
the application of a rule to the speciﬁed object only.
The set of rules speciﬁed for the ﬂow policies generated
by a ﬂow policy’s originator are locally stored into a
repository called Rule Base (RB).
Example 2 Examples of rules referred to the ﬂow pol-
icy of Example 1 are the following:
<(r id1,delete,//vice manager[@cid="50"],rp3,NO PROP),
(r id2,update,//vice manager[@cid="50"],rp4,PROP)>
T h eﬁ r s tr u l ea l l o w sv i c emanager Jim (see Figure 2)
to delete the receiver proﬁle contained in the second re-
ceiver speciﬁcation, whereas the second rule allows the
same subject to update the credential expression and
the extension speciﬁcation associated with the receiverproﬁle contained in the third receiver speciﬁcation. 
3 Flow Policy Control Information
To correctly enforce the modiﬁcation of the ﬂow
policy portions and to allow a receiver to locally check
the integrity of those portions, we need to associate
with a ﬂow policy some control information, referred
to as ﬂow policy attachment. Flow policy portions are
grouped together according to the set of rules that ap-
ply to them forming some regions. All the ﬂow policy
portions to which no rule applies belong to a unique
non-modiﬁable region, whereas the other portions be-
long to modiﬁable regions. Control information associ-
ated with the non-modiﬁable region consists of a hash
value computed over all the ﬂow policy portions that
belong to that region. To protect the authenticity of
this information the ﬂow policy’s originator encrypts
this hash value with its private key.
Before presenting the control information associ-
ated with modiﬁable regions we have to introduce the
concept of ﬂow policy modiﬁcation certiﬁcate.Aﬂ o w
policy modiﬁcation certiﬁcate is generated by the ﬂow
policy’s originator according to the rules in RB.G i v e n
a modiﬁcation control rule mcr belonging to RB and
a subject sbj to which mcr applies a ﬂow policy modi-
ﬁcation certiﬁcate, generated for sbj according to mcr,
contains the following information: the sbj’s public key
(sbj-pubkey), the privilege contained in mcr (priv),
and the set of regions and corresponding ﬂow policy
portions, to which mcr applies. Each certiﬁcate is
signed by the ﬂow policy’s originator with its private
key for authentication purpose and distributed to the
subject to which it belongs to.
Modiﬁable regions can be classiﬁed in three dif-
ferent categories: updatable, deletable,a n dupdatable-
deletable regions. Updatable regions contain ﬂow pol-
icy portions to which only rules containing the update
privilege apply. Deletable regions contain ﬂow pol-
icy portions to which only rules containing the delete
privilege apply. Whereas updatable-deletable regions
contain ﬂow policy portions to which rules containing
both delete and update privilege apply. Control infor-
mation associated with a modiﬁable region is diﬀerent
according to the corresponding category. For exam-
ple, a signature is computed by the last subject that
has updated an updatable region ur on the ﬂow policy
portions belonging to ur i t s e l fa n di n s e r t e di nt h eﬂ o w
policy attachment. A modiﬁable region also contains a
set of ﬂow policy modiﬁcation certiﬁcates used by the
subsequent receivers to verify that the modiﬁcations
executed till that point over the region are correct wrt
the speciﬁed policies and rules.
4 Receiver Declarations
A subject that has received a package can exercise
on the document and/or on the ﬂow policy portions
the privileges contained in the document/ﬂow policy
modiﬁcation certiﬁcates that it has received by the
originators. The jth receiver of a package must sat-
isfy the jth receiver speciﬁcation in the ﬂow policy to
be a valid receiver. To allow subsequent receivers to
check that it is really a valid jth receiver, it has to
insert within the jth receiver speciﬁcation rs one of
its credentials that satisﬁes at least one of the creden-
tial expressions associated with the alternative receiver
proﬁles belonging to rs. Moreover, it has to specify
the identity of the next receiver. Finally, it can also
insert two types of declarations within rs:adocument
modiﬁcation declaration and/or a ﬂow policy modiﬁca-
tion declaration. The former declaration contains the
list of all modiﬁcation operations executed over doc-
ument portions. Each declared operation is given in
terms of the executed privilege and list of modiﬁed
document portions. A corresponding certiﬁcate must
be inserted in the modiﬁed region in the proper region
control component. The latter declaration is similar to
the former one, indeed also in this case it contains the
list of modiﬁcation operations executed over the ﬂow
policy. A corresponding ﬂow policy modiﬁcation cer-
tiﬁcate must be inserted in the proper region. Before
sending the updated package to the next receiver it has
also to sign the whole rs’s content for authentication
and integrity purposes. All the declarations stored in
the ﬂow policy form the so called modiﬁcation history
of both the document and the ﬂow policy.
To prevent a subject sbj that has received several
times the same package from sending an old package
version to another subject, each receiver sends its cur-
rent version of the ﬂow policy attachment to all the
other subjects involved in the distributed and collab-
orative update process.
Example 3 Figure 3 shows the package received by
the ﬁrst subject involved in a distributed and collab-
orative process and the updated package sent by this
subject to the subsequent one. In particular, the ﬁrst
subject deletes a receiver proﬁle belonging to the third
receiver speciﬁcation, according to the ﬂow policy mod-
iﬁcation certiﬁcate (fpmc1) that it has received by the
proper ﬂow policy originator. It also inserts in the
ﬂow policy attachment the required information before
signing the content of its corresponding receiver spec-
iﬁcation (i.e., the ﬁrst one) and then it inserts in the
package the used certiﬁcate in the proper ﬂow policy
region (fpaR2). rp1￿
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Figure 3: Package received by a subject and then sent after execution of some modiﬁcations
5P r o t o c o l s
In this section we present the protocols executed
by a receiver to check the integrity of a package and
to exercise privileges on the document or ﬂow poli-
cies, and the protocols executed by the originators to
recover a corrupted package version.
5.1 Receiver Protocol
A subject sbj upon receiving a package executes
the integrity check procedure to detect possible cor-
ruptions to the package content. First, the ﬂow pol-
icy and the document are analyzed. Since a subject
has received by the subjects that have already received
the package the corresponding ﬂow policy attachments
and it has saved the correct one with the highest num-
ber of receivers, it is enabled to check if the ﬂow policy
contained in the received package contains or not all
those receivers that have notiﬁed their package recep-
tion. If this correspondence is not veriﬁed an error
occurs and sbj sends a ﬂow policy recovery request to
the originator of the ﬂow policy (or sub-ﬂow policy)
that contains the sender of the received package. The
same activity is executed if during the ﬂow policy in-
tegrity check an error occurs. Moreover, if an error
occurs during the document integrity check process a
recovery request is sent to the document’s originator to
obtain a package that contains the last correct version
of the corrupted regions. The integrity veriﬁcation is
based, in both cases, on the check that the current con-
tent is the result of the execution of all and only the
operations declared in the ﬂow policies by the previous
receivers starting from the original content and that
such modiﬁcation operations are legal wrt the poli-
cies and the rules stored respectively in the repository
called Policy Base(PB)a n dRB of the originators.
5.2 Originator Protocol
An originator in our approach is in charge of gen-
erating documents and/or ﬂow policies, all the corre-
sponding control information and all the needed cer-
tiﬁcates. It has also to take care of sending the decryp-
tion keys associated with document regions, document
modiﬁcation certiﬁcates, and ﬂow policy modiﬁcation
certiﬁcates to the proper subjects. Moreover, an orig-
inator has to manage recovery requests received by
subjects involved in the update process. If it receives
a ﬂow policy recovery request regarding the delivery
of an old version of a package or concerning an er-ror aﬀecting a region in a (sub-)ﬂow policy, the orig-
inator sends a message to each subject stored in the
ﬂow policy attachment that it has locally saved, to
obtain a package containing a correct ﬂow policy ver-
sion, starting from the last subject in the ﬂow pol-
icy and going backwards. The process ends when the
originator receives a package satisfying the required
property. Once the package has been recovered, as
last step, the originator sends to the subject sbj from
which it has received that package the request of send-
ing that package to a diﬀerent receiver. The originator
also notiﬁes all the other subjects that sbj will send the
rebuilt package to a receiver subject that it chooses.
Note that such a chosen receiver must be diﬀerent from
the subject to which the package had been sent before
by sbj. If the originator receives a document recov-
ery request for a document that it has generated, it
sends a message to each subject stored in the ﬂow pol-
icy attachment that it has locally saved to obtain a
package containing the last correct version of one or
more corrupted regions, starting from the last subject
in the ﬂow policy and going backwards. The process
ends when the originator collects from the received
packages the last correct version of all the corrupted
regions. Then, it inserts in the package received by
the subject s who sent the recovery request all these
correct region versions and it sends back this updated
package to s. Finally, the originator notiﬁes all the
other subjects the set of document modiﬁcation dec-
larations that must no longer be considered for docu-
ment integrity check.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented how a distributed
and collaborative update process can support speciﬁ-
cation and modiﬁcation of ﬂow policies. In particular
we have shown the ﬂow policy modiﬁcation control
model that regulates who can modify a ﬂow policy
or its portions and the infrastructure needed to en-
force a correct exercise of the privileges supported by
our model. We plan to extend this work along two
main directions. First, a feature that we intend to ad-
dress is the possibility, for a receiver, of entering, in the
ﬂow policy attachment, only the required information
needed to guarantee that it is a valid receiver, instead
of a whole credential. Secondly, we plan to implement
a prototype system and test the performance and the
overhead implied by our solution.
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